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The Decision
Forming a huddle in the lounge car of the train during the return trip, the aircraft men talked over Dallas and the plant they had just surveyed. Their enthusiasm turned the discussions into concrete planning sessions. By the time they reached Stratford, they had laid out, mentally, Chance Vought’s operations in the new plant. One of the men said, when the clanging of the cars kept him awake, he would simply count the Corsairs rolling out of the new plant, and would fall into blissful sleep. But once the men were back in Stratford, and had gotten down to the real job of planning, there were many nights when work took the place of slumber. Only a handful of persons could be let in on the plans, nebulous and uncertain as they were; and so a small group of men had to round up the facts and do a lot of figuring which ordinarily would have taken a very large group of men. There was a Herculean task of making detailed proposals and layouts for the move, and of negotiating leases and drawing up final arrangements for the transfer.
At the Dallas end, businessmen garnered information Chance Vought needed, and DeShong relayed it to Reid’s home. At the plant, the RFC man kept a close vigil over machine tools Chance Vought might need which were in the process of being declared surplus. When such material was in danger of being sold, he would inform Chance Vought so that the company might have an opportunity to save on needed items. Drawings and photographs of the Dallas plant were sent to Stratford, and the move planners poured and pondered over them unendingly. The Navy, too, was doing much toward making the proposed transfer a reality. Having perceived that Chance Vought’s occupancy of the plant would be of value to the nation’s security, both because of the plant’s strategic location and its expandability in case of war. The Navy gave valuable assistance and advice to Vought in its studies, and devoted much constructive thought to Vought’s problems in connection with the transfer.
By March 1947, reports and information had been compiled to show that there was a great advantage to Chance Vought in the Dallas move. A second visit was made to the plant. This time, the move seemed a great enough possibility that H. M. Horner and C. J. McCarthy, president and vice-president of United, went to look over the factory. Activity around the big plant by now had aroused curiosity. The Dallas press was getting inquisitive. The aircraft men let the press in on their plans. Harry Withers and Bill Ruggles, of the Dallas Morning News, and Allen Merriam and B. S. Jefferson, of the Dallas Times Herald, were called in and asked to keep Chance Vought’s interest in the plant a secret. The story was well guarded, despite the increasingly numerous visits of Chance Vought personnel to Dallas in the months that followed.
In the spring and summer, Espey, the facilities manager, and Tipple, chief industrial engineer, with others, made several visits to the plant. They were studying the amount of rehabilitation that would adapt the factory to Chance Vought’s operations. The purchasing department was studying the effects of the move on the cost of materials, and working up estimates of the expense of transporting equipment and personnel. Another subject of constant study was the adjoining airport, which needed longer runways.
In June 1947, enough facts were assembled and plans laid that Chance Vought could make a detailed report to the Navy on the advantages and feasibility of the move. So began the complex negotiations that preceded the transfer. Even while these negotiations were in progress, there were other plants for Chance Vought to consider, and other tenants for the Navy to consider. But the result of all these deviations was that the Dallas plant proved to be the ideal one for Chance Vought, and Chance Vought the ideal tenant for the Dallas plant. In November, news of the impending move leaked through Washington into the newspapers. The Stratford community, employees, labor organizations, all put pressure on Chance Vought’s management to iron out the remaining details. Were they, or weren’t they, going to Texas. The question came from all sides. As far along as the negotiations had gone, that question couldn’t be answered. There were financial problems. There was the matter of the Stratford factory, whose ownership was as scrambled as the architecture of the plant itself. (In a single office, three walls might be owned by Chance Vought while the floors, ceiling, and the fourth wall by the Government.) Besides that, the Navy was just in the process of taking title to the Dallas plant, and there was the question of maintenance and protection of the “A” building of the plant, occupied by the Texas Engineering and Manufacturing company. These were only a few of the problems. But through the necessarily long negotiations, Chance Vought was not standing still. It was keeping its plans so current that had the move started the next day, it would have been ready to go. To coordinate this early planning, Beisel appointed a committee of three: the facilities manager, the assistant factory manager and the personnel manager.
Production schedules for the F4U-5 and the F6U-1 airplanes were made up and converted into manpower requirements. Press releases were prepared for issuance when the move was authorized. A brochure of information about Dallas was compiled. Tentative layouts for the entire plant were made. A survey of Stratford facilities was complete in every detail. Shipping problems were studied. Types of containers for shipment were recommended. Surveys were made of freight rates, wages, labor supply and housing availability. Supervisors were evaluated as for their fitness for transfer. Simplified paper work forms were made up.
Many times a decision seemed imminent. In December, a phone call informed D. A. Hulcy, president of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, that there was but one major obstacle remaining: Nothing tangible had been done about lengthening the runway. Some four days later, the Dallas City Council had passed a resolution to set aside $256,000 toward improving runways at Hensley Field. But still a few problems remained unsolved and many times a signal for an alert trailed off into a false alarm. Hemmert, assigned to hold down the fort in Dallas and to begin activities if an announcement broke, once had an excited phone call that the news would be released the next day. But many more days passed without a decision. In so gigantic a transaction, every precaution had to be taken that no errors were being made. It was a move without precedent, and once it had begun, there could be no turning back.
At last, at the beginning of March 1948, all questions in connection with the lease and transfer seemed to have been answered to everyone’s satisfaction. With the move geared to go, tension was high in Chance Vought, and again there was a hitch in the plans. A new hangar was needed; and further, the Navy, making its final review of the floor plans, foresaw that if the maximum expandability was to be achieved, all space in the manufacturing building would be required for production operations. Therefore they advised Chance Vought to avoid using part of the factory mezzanine for engineering offices. Vought, therefore, made plans for constructing a new building for the engineers.
Estimates on the two construction projects were rushed through and approved, and at last, after eighteen arduous months of planning, rescheduling, discussion and negotiations, announcement could be formally made on April 18, 1948, that Chance Vought Aircraft would move its operations to Texas.
In announcing the move, the employees were told: “As you know, there is still considerable work to be done at the Stratford plant in completing the F4U-5 contract alone. The most important project for Stratford will, of course, be the production of the F6U-1 airplane, which will carry us well into 1949. Experimental contracts will also be continued at Stratford, and it is expected that these, too, will extend into 1949. “The move itself will consume many months, and it will be a year or more before we will have full-scale production in Dallas. The move has been scheduled by sections, and will be gradual for two reasons. First, that the community and employees will benefit, and secondly, because it will take time to provide the housing facilities in Dallas that will eventually be required. We believe that at least 1,500 employees will be transferred to Dallas. This total will be made up of shop employees, office workers, supervisors and engineering employees. Opportunity will be given for all employees to indicate their personal feelings concerning a possible transfer to Dallas.”
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